Lindsay Germer v. Famous Dave\u27s and/or Wausau Insurance Company and Utah Labor Commission : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Lindsay Germer v. Famous Dave's and/or Wausau
Insurance Company and Utah Labor Commission
: Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Aaron J. Prisbrey; Attorney for Appellant .
Bret Gardner; Kristy L. Bertelsen; Blackburn & Stoll; Attorney for Appellee/Respondents; Alan
Hennebold; Labor Commission of Utah; Attorney for Labor Commission of Utah.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Germer v. Famous Dave\'s, No. 20080442 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/931
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Court of Appeals 
Case No.: 2008-0442 
Priority 7 
FAMOUS DAVE'S, and/or WAUSAU 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and UTAH : 
LABOR COMMISSION, Labor Commission No.: 05-0318 
Respondents/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
FAMOUS DAVE'S and WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY 
Appeal from the Utah Labor Commission 
Bret A. Gardner 4^. i / laron J. Prisbrey 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 1090 East Tabernacle St. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC St. George, UT 84770 
Attorneys for Appellees Famous Dave's Attorney for Lindsay Germer/ Appellant 
and Wausau Insurance 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Deputy Commissioner 
Labor Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
LINDSAY GERMER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
APPELLEES RESPECTFULLY REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND THAT THIS CASE BE REPORTED. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDSAY GERMER, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
FAMOUS DAVE'S, and/or WAUSAU 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and UTAH 
LABOR COMMISSION, 
Respondents/Appellees. 
Court of Appeals 
Case No.: 2008-0442 
Priority 7 
Labor Commission No.: 05-0318 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
FAMOUS DAVE'S and WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY 
Appeal from the Utah Labor Commission 
Bret A. Gardner Aaron J. Prisbrey 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 1090 East Tabernacle St. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC St. George, UT 84770 
Attorneys for Appellees Famous Dave's Attorney for Lindsay Germer/ Appellant 
and Wausau Insurance 
257 East 200 South, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Alan L. Hennebold 
Deputy Commissioner 
Labor Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
APPELLEES RESPECTFULLY REQUEST ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND THAT THIS CASE BE REPORTED. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5 
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 5 
Statement of Facts 8 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 17 
ARGUMENT 20 
POINT 1: THE LABOR COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
PETITIONER'S INDUSTRIAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT 
COMPENSABLE 20 
A. Ms. Germer has failed to Marshall the Evidence 21 
B. There is Substantial Evidence To Support the Commission's 
Findings Regarding What Exertions Were Involved in the Work 
Accident 22 
C. The Labor Commission Acted Reasonably and Rationally in Ruling 
That Ms. Germer's Injury Did Not Meet the Higher Legal Causation 
Standard 25 
POINT 2: THE COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE MS. GERMER'S RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS WHEN IT ADMITTED CERTAIN EVIDENCE. . . 30 
Ms. Germer was not surprised by the testimony of Scott Morton or 
the photographs of the walk-in cooler which were introduced as 
evidence at the evidentiary hearing 30 
ii 
POINT 3: THE COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN COURT'S 
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHEN IT ISSUED 
THE ORDER DENYING BENEFITS 34 
CONCLUSION 36 
ADDENDUM 
1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Administrative 
Law Judge Dale Sessions, dated April 5, 2006 Attachment A 
2. Order Affirming ALJ's Decision dated April 23, 2008 . . Attachment B 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE LAW 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) . . . 4,17, 18, 20, 26, 28 
A.E. Clevite. 2000 UT App 35, 996 P.2d 1072 2 
Acosta v. Labor Comm'n. 2002 UT App 67 2 
Bigler v. TW Services. MD 95-0838-CA (8/8/96) 28 
Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1997) 1, 24 
Caporoz v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 945 P.2d 141 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) 2, 3 
Cross v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah CT. App. 
1992) 2 
Duke v. Graham. 2007 UT 31 (Utah 2007) 3, 34 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. 
App.1998) 1, 21 
Martinez v. Media-Pavmaster Plus. 2007 UT 42 (Utah 2007) 1,21 
Miller v.USAACas. Ins. Co.. 44 P.3d 663, 2002 UT 6, 44 P.3d 663 34 
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. 245 P. 343 (Utah 1926) 
31 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998) 22 
Wade v. Stagl. 869 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 22 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co. 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1991) 1, 21 
West Valley City v. Roberts. 993 P.2d 252 (Utah 1999) 3 
iv 
Whitear v. Labor Comm'n. 973 P.2d 982(Utah 1998) 24 
Workers Comp. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n. 761 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App.1998) . . 
31 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-104 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 4, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801 1, 24 
Utah Code Ann. §63-G-4-206 30 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 2, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 1 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 11 34 
Utah R. App. P.24 1 
v 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Appellant, Lindsay Germer, is from a final order of 
the Labor Commission of Utah dated April 23,2008. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63G-4-403, and 
78-2a-3(2)(a) (2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1 : Did the Commission properly determine the mechanism of accident 
in this case? 
Standard: A court must uphold the commission's factual findings if such 
findings are supported by substantial evidence based upon the record as a 
whole. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (4)(g). See Brown & Root Indus. Serv. 
v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1997). To successfully challenge 
an agency's factual findings, the party, "must marshall all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light 
of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence." Martinez v. Media-Pavmaster Plus. 2007 UT42 (Utah 
2007); Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 776 P.2d 63,68 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging 
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding."). This requires counsel to construct the evidence 
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supporting the adversary's position, and then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah 
1991). Compliance with this undertaking helps ensure that the factual findings 
of the agency are overturned only when lacking in substantial evidence. 
Issue 2: Was the Labor Commission "reasonable and rational" when it 
determined that the higher standard of legal causation was not satisfied by kicking 
a cooler door open while carrying trays of meat? 
Standard: This involves the application of facts to the law where the Labor 
Commission has a grant of discretion. Reasonableness and rationality 
standard applies. SeeA.E.CIevite. 2000 UT App 35, H1J6-7;1 Acosta v. Labor 
1
 In A.E. Clevite. Inc. v. Labor Comm'n. 2000 UT App 35,1J6, 996 P.2d 1072, 
the court stated: 
The applicable standard of review for a formal adjudicative 
hearing is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA). 'When the Legislature has granted an agency discretion to 
determine an issue, we review the agency's action for reasonableness. 
Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n. 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); 
see Cross v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 824 P.2d 1202,1204 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating 'when there exists a grant of discretion, 
'we will not disturb the Board's application of its factual findings to the 
law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality') (citation omitted).... 
In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission 
discretion to determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all 
cases coming before it. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997). As 
such, we must uphold the Commission's determination that [petitioner's] 
injury "arose out of and in the course o f his employment, unless the 
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Comm'n. 2002 UT App 67,1J11. (Respondents disagree with Ms. Germer's 
standard of review which she notes is a correction of error standard). 
Issue 3: Did the Commission violate Ms. Germer's right to due process in 
allowing a company representative to testify at hearing and in admitting certain 
photographs? 
Standard: Due process challenges are questions of law that the court reviews 
under a correction of error standard. See West Valley City v. Roberts. 993 
P.2d 252 (Utah 1999). 
Issue 4: Did the Commission violate constitutional open court provisions 
when it took nearly two years to issue its Order denying benefits? 
Standard: Review of constitutional violations are questions of law, reviewed 
for correctness. See Duke v. Graham. 2007 UT 31, ^7 (Utah 2007). 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality so 
as to constitute an abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(h)(i) of 
the UAPA. See Caporoz. 945 P.2d at 143 (indicating agency has 
abused its discretion when agency action is unreasonable). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative law is Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 (Utah "Workers 
Compensation Act"), the provision authorizing workers' compensation for industrial 
accidents. This section reads as follows: 
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is 
injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the course of 
the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, 
shall be paid . . . compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury . . . such amount for medical, nurse, 
and hospital services . . . [and] medicines . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2003). 
The section emphasized above was interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23 (Utah 1986), to require a 
claimant to prove both medical and legal causation in order for the claimant to 
establish his or her entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
This case presents the question whether an employee of Famous Dave's is 
entitled to worker's compensation benefits arising from an industrial event that 
occurred while working as an assistant manager on October 30, 2004. 
On April 1, 2005, Lindsay Germer (hereinafter, "Ms. Germer") filed an 
Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission. She alleged entitlement 
to certain workers' compensation benefits from an October 30,2004 work accident 
(hereinafter, the "accident"). (R., at 1) 
On May 11, 2005, Famous Dave's and/or Wausau Insurance (hereinafter, 
"Famous Dave's") filed an Answer to the Application for Hearing. (R., at 12) 
On May 13, 2005, Ms. Germer served certain Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production of Documents and Things, via United States mail, on Famous Dave's. 
On June 2, 2005, Famous Dave's filed an Answer to Ms. Germer's First Set 
of Interrogatories and a Response to Ms. Germer's First Request for Production of 
Documents and Things. (R., at 63). 
On December 20,2005, Ms. Germer served on Famous Dave's a Second Set 
of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents and Things. 
On February 21, 2006, Famous Dave's filed an Answer to Ms. Germer's 
Second Set of Interrogatories and a Response to Ms. Germer's Second Request for 
Production of Documents and Things. 
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On February 14, 2006, Ms. Germer filed Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., at 19) 
On February 21,2006, Famous Dave's filed Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., at 24) 
On March 8, 2006, Famous Dave's filed a Supplemental Answer to Ms. 
Germer's Interrogatories. (R., at 72). On this same date, Famous Dave's also filed 
Supplemental Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., at 28) 
Approximately seven to ten days prior to the evidentiary hearing, counsel for 
Famous Dave's contacted counsel for Ms. Germer to discuss the Supplemental 
Answers to Interrogatories provided by Famous Dave's to Ms. Germer. Counsel for 
Famous Dave's informed counsel for Ms. Germer of Famous Dave's' intent to call 
Scott Morton as a witness. The subject matter of Mr. Morton's testimony was 
discussed during that telephone conversation. Counsel for Famous Dave's also 
informed counsel for Ms. Germer that Mr. Morton would take several photographs 
of the walk-in cooler at Respondent Famous Dave's Restaurant that would be 
introduced into evidence at the evidentiary hearing for illustrative purposes. 
Although available for review, counsel for Ms. Germer made no demand from 
counsel for Famous Dave's to review the photographs prior to the evidentiary 
hearing. 
On March 31,2006, the ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing. A copy of the 
hearing record has been provided. 
On April 5, 2006, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order. (R.,at45). 
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On May 5, 2006, Ms. Germer filed a Motion for Review. (R., at 51) 
On June 1, 2006, Famous Dave's filed a Response to the Motion for Review. 
(R., at 82). 
On June 27, 2006, Ms. Germer filed a Reply to Response to Motion for 
Review (R., at 155). 
On April 23, 2008, the Commission entered an Order Affirming ALJ's 
Decision. (R., at 164). 
Ms. Germer has subsequently filed a Petition for Review to the Court of 
Appeals. 
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Statement of Facts 
1. Lindsay Germer began working for Famous Dave's as a server in June of 
2004. As of October 30, 2004, she had been promoted to assistant 
manager. (Tr., 22). 
2. Ms. Germer began work at 7:00 am on October 30, 2004. As part of her 
duties she was required to go into a walk-in cooler to pick up trays of meat 
that needed to be cooked for the day. 
3. The cooler door was fairly standard - three to four feet wide. (Tr., 24). 
Although Ms. Germer testified at hearing that the cooler door stuck on 
occasion, Ms. Germer and Scott Morton (the area manager) both testified 
that the door on the cooler was fully operational at the time of her alleged 
industrial accident. Several photographs of the cooler door were admitted 
at hearing. (R. 34-37, 40-42, 44). 
4. At 9:00 am, Ms. Germer entered the cooler and picked up trays of meat in 
the cooler, weighing collectively 48 pounds. (Tr., 28). Ms. Germer picked 
up three trays of meat (each tray being 18" x 24", much like a cookie 
sheet). (Tr., 27-28). Ms. Germer walked with the trays at waist height and 
stepped in front of the cooler door. Ms. Germer stopped in front of the 
cooler door and planted both feet since the inner floor of the cooler had 
condensation from thawing meat. She did not make a forward continuous 
movement toward the walk-in cooler door (Tr., 67). Ms. Germer stood 
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about one to two feet from the cooler door and lifted her right foot and 
kicked the door with he foot to open it. (Tr., 87). The door did not stick 
shut. At that time, Ms. Germer felt immediate pain in her right knee. Ms. 
Germer did not injure her right knee by slipping and falling to the cooler 
room floor. Her feet were firmly planted and well-grounded. She did not 
trip. She did not slip. She did not stumble. She did not awkwardly twist 
her knee nor lose her balance. Ms. Germer's right knee made no direct 
contact with the door or with the floor. (Tr., 30). 
5. Ms. Germer worked the remainder of her shift and the two days that 
followed. (Tr., 33). 
6. On November 1, 2004, Ms. Germer sought medical treatment for right knee 
pain. She was off work for several days and worked for another five 
weeks, until December 13, 2004, at which time she resigned. (Tr., 34) 
7. On January 2, 2005, Ms. Germer began working for a new employer -
Outback Steakhouse - as a waitress. 
8. On February 5, 2005, Ms. Germer sought treatment with Dr. Scott Parry. 
(R., 170 at 8). Dr. Parry noted that Ms. Germer has a long standing history 
of right knee problems dating back to at least April 2001 when she had a 
PCL reconstruction performed by Dr. John Edwards. Dr. Parry 
recommended an MRI to assess the consequences of the October 30, 
2004 industrial event. (R., 170 at 8). 
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9. On February 25, 2005, Ms. Germer underwent surgery to her right knee for 
a PCL reconstruction. (R., 170 at 125). 
10. On June 7, 2005, Dr. Parry indicated that Ms. Germer would likely reach 
medical stability in August or September 2005. (R., 170, at 125). 
11. On September 27, 2005, Dr. Marble performed an independent medical 
evaluation. He diagnosed Ms. Germer with chronic right knee pain status 
post surgery in 1993, PCL reconstruction in 2001 and 2005 with 
degeneration (R., 170 at 133). Dr. Marble notes a long standing history of 
bilateral knee problems dating back to 1991, with several accidents 
following that date. Dr. Marble noted that no additional care is warranted 
on an industrial basis for the event on October 30, 2004. (R., 170 at 136). 
12. Ms. Germer's right knee problems are well documented in the medical 
records submitted to the court. (R., 170). The parties do not dispute this 
treatment. 
A. Ms. Germer was treated for a right knee condition as early as 
January 14, 1991. Doctors note at that time that Ms. Germer had 
patello-femoral pain following athletic activities. (R., 170 at 2). 
B. In 1992, Ms. Germer underwent radiological studies at the Ogden 
Clinic showing degenerative changes in her knee and probable knee 
calcification. (R., 170 at 3). 
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C. Ms. Germer also fell onto her right knee on or about January 20, 
2001, while working at an assisted living center (catching her toe on 
the door jam of the floor) and was treated for a right knee sprain and 
possible ligament tear. (R., 170 at 172). She was given crutches 
and a knee immobilizer at that time. She underwent physical therapy 
for her right knee for approximately thirty-three visits (33) in 2001. 
She eventually underwent surgery to her right knee in February, 
2001 performed by Dr. John Edwards. (R., 170 at 56). 
D. Following this surgery, Ms. Germer re-injured her right knee by 
falling in April 2001. An additional surgery was performed on April 
27,2001. (R., 170 at 106). 
E. In October 2001, Ms. Germer underwent hardware removal in her 
right knee. (R., 170 at 163). 
F. Ms. Germer was also treated on December 27, 2003, for a right knee 
sprain when she slipped on pavement. She was prescribed Percocet 
for right knee pain. 
G. Ms. Germer continued to treat in January, 2004 for right knee 
problems and underwent an MRI on January 14, 2004 due to 
continued knee pain. (R.,170 at 114). 
13. Ms. Germer sought workers' compensation benefits as a result of the 
October, 2004 event which were denied by Famous Dave's. 
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14. On April 1, 2005, Ms. Germer filed an Application for Hearing seeking 
temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, medical expenses 
and recommended medical care for the October 30, 2004 accident. (R., 1). 
15. On May 11, 2005, Famous Dave's filed an Answer denying compensability 
for lack of medical causation, due to Ms. Germer's long standing history of 
knee problems. Famous Dave's also denied Ms. Germer's claim for lack of 
legal causation. (R., 13-14). 
16. On May 13, 2005, Ms. Germer served Interrogatories and Requests for 
Production of Documents and Things, via United States mail, on Famous 
Dave's. 
17. On June 2, 2005, Famous Dave's filed an Answer to Ms. Germer's First 
Set of Interrogatories and a Response to Ms. Germer's First Request for 
Production of Documents and Things. (R., 63). 
18. On December 20, 2005, Ms. Germer served on Famous Dave's a Second 
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents and 
Things. 
19. On February 21, 2006, Famous Dave's filed an Answer to Ms. Germer's 
Second Set of Interrogatories and a Response to Ms. Germer's Second 
Request for Production of Documents and Things. 
20. On February 14, 2006, Ms. Germer filed Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., 19). 
21. On February 21, 2006, Famous Dave's filed Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., 24) 
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22. On March 8, 2006, Famous Dave's filed a Supplemental Answer to Ms. 
Germer's Interrogatories. (R., 72). In the Supplemental Answer, Famous 
Dave's informed Ms. Germer of Famous Dave's intent to call Scott Morton 
as a witness at the evidentiary hearing. Famous Dave's provided Ms. 
Germer with a summary of the testimony to be solicited from Mr. Morton. 
23. On March 8, 2006, Famous Dave's also filed Supplemental Pre-Trial 
Disclosures. (R., 28). Again, Famous Dave's notified Ms. Germer of their 
intent to call Scott Morton as a witness. Famous Dave's also notified Ms. 
Germer of their intent to submits photographs of the walk-in cooler and 
cooler door at Famous Dave's Restaurant in St. George. (R., 29). 
24. Approximately seven to ten days prior to the evidentiary hearing, counsel 
for Famous Dave's contacted counsel for Ms. Germer to discuss the 
Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories provided by Famous Dave's to 
Ms. Germer. Counsel for Famous Dave's informed counsel for Ms. Germer 
of Famous Dave's' intent to call Scott Morton as a witness. The subject 
matter of Mr. Morton's testimony was discussed during that telephone 
conversation. Counsel for Famous Dave's also informed counsel for Ms. 
Germer that Mr. Morton would take several photographs of the walk-in 
cooler at Respondent Famous Dave's Restaurant that would be introduced 
into evidence at the evidentiary hearing for illustrative purposes. Although 
available for review, counsel for Ms. Germer made no demand from 
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counsel for Famous Dave's to review the photographs prior to the 
evidentiary hearing. Moreover, counsel for Ms. Germer made no request 
to schedule the deposition or to conduct any sort of interview of Mr. Morton. 
25. On March 31, 2006, the ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing. A copy of 
the hearing record has been provided. At the hearing, Ms. Germer testified 
regarding her medical history and the mechanism of accident on October 
30, 2004. 
26. Over the objection of Ms. Germer, Famous Dave's was allowed to present 
testimony of Scott Morton, the area director for Famous Dave's. (Tr., 99). 
Ms. Germer objected to the testimony of Mr. Morton since Famous Dave's 
did not designate Mr. Morton as a witness in their initial discovery 
responses. Famous Dave's argued that Ms. Germer had notice of Mr. 
Morton in supplemental responses and in pre-trial disclosures of March 8, 
2006. 
27. At hearing, the ALJ admitted photographs of the cooler and cooler door. 
(R., 34-44). 
28. Mr. Morton testified that no one had ever reported the cooler door sticking 
and that Ms. Germer did not report any malfunctioning door to Mr. Morton 
at any time (TR, at 123-124). 
29. On April 5, 2006, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order. (R., 45). The ALJ found that Ms. Germer had a pre-existing right 
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knee condition that contributed to the claimed industrial accident, giving 
rise to the application of the higher standard of legal causation. The ALJ 
found that the mode of injury did not satisfy the higher standard of legal 
causation. On this basis, the ALJ found that Ms. Germer's claim was not 
compensable under Utah law. 
30. On May 5, 2006, Ms. Germer filed a Motion for Review. (R.,51). Ms. 
Germer argued that the ALJ erred in allowing testimony of Mr. Morton and 
photographs of the cooler into evidence. She also argued that the ALJ 
erred in evaluating the legal causation test given the weight of the meat 
Ms. Germer was carrying. (R., 60-61). Ms. Germer did not argue (1) that 
the ALJ disregarded evidence that the floor was wet with condensation; or, 
(2) that the ALJ disregarded medical records of her orthopedic surgeon 
whom she now states noted the, "forcefulness" of her fall. 
31. On June 1, 2006, Famous Dave's filed a Response to the Motion for 
Review. (R., 82). 
32. On June 27, 2006, Ms. Germer filed a Reply to Response to Motion for 
Review (R., 155). 
33. On April 23, 2008, the Commission entered an Order Affirming ALJ's 
Decision. (R.,164). The Commission agreed with the ALJ that Ms. Germer 
did not satisfy her burden of establishing that the higher standard of legal 
causation was met. Specifically, the Commission found that the cooler door 
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kicked by Ms. Germer did not stick when she kicked it. The Commission 
also found that prior to the accident, Ms. Germer had a pre-existing right 
knee condition and had undergone several surgeries to repair 
the right knee. (R., 164). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
First, the Commission properly determined that Ms. Germer's industrial 
claim was not compensable for failing to satisfy the higher standard of legal 
causation as articulated in Allen v. Industrial Commission. Ms. Germer failed to 
show that the mode of accident was an unusual or extraordinary exertion when 
compared to non-industrial 20th century activities. There is substantial evidence 
to support the Commission's finding regard the mode of accident. Indeed, Ms. 
Germer's testimony revealed that, while carrying trays of meat, she kicked the 
cooler door with her right foot while her left foot remained grounded. Ms. Germer 
was not in continuous motion at the time of the event and was well- balanced on 
both when she kicked the door open. She did not trip. She did not slip. She did 
not stumble. She did not fall to the ground. In fact, Ms. Germer's right knee never 
came in direct contact with the cooler door, nor did her right knee come in contact 
with the cooler floor as she slumped to the ground after kicking the door with her 
right foot. 
Given the mechanism of injury, the ALJ and Commission acted reasonably 
and rationally in finding that the physical exertion placed on Ms. Germer's right 
knee at the time she claimed to have kicked the walk-in cooler door with her right 
foot was not extraordinary or unusual. The trays of ribs that Ms. Germer held in 
her arms at the time of the alleged accident had no bearing on the physical 
exertion, if any, placed on Ms. Germer's right knee at the time she attempted to 
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kick the walk-in cooler door with her right foot. Ms. Germer did not injure her right 
knee from having carried the trays of ribs. Moreover, there was nothing awkward, 
extraordinary or difficult about her effort to hold the trays of ribs as Ms. Germer 
attempted to kick the walk-in cooler door with her right foot. Despite carrying the 
trays of ribs, Ms. Germer was balanced, well-grounded, and stable at the time 
she claims to have kicked the door with her right foot. 
The Commission and ALJ properly examined the mechanism of injury in 
the context of the Allen decision to activities in non-employment life. The 
Commission properly determined that in non-industrial life, persons use their feet 
to kick a door, slide a box or garbage can, or even move furniture or other items. 
Oftentimes, such an action may occur while the person is lifting or carrying 
certain objects. The ALJ and Commission were also correct to discern that 
individuals in their non-employment life use their feet to kick a ball while engaging 
in a sport or other type of extra-curricular activity. This alleged accident is also 
similar to non-employment physical activities such as climbing or descending 
stairs, or stepping on uneven surfaces. 
Second, the Commission did not violate Ms. Germer's right to due process 
in admitting testimony of Scott Morton and photographs of the cooler and cooler 
door. Contrary to Ms. Germer's argument, she was not surprised by this 
evidence. Several weeks prior to the evidentiary hearing, Famous Dave's 
informed Ms. Germer of this testimony and evidence by way of pre-trial 
18 
disclosures, supplemental discovery and telephone conferences with Ms. 
Germer's attorney. However, Ms. Germer's counsel made no request to depose 
Mr. Morton, conduct any sort of pre-hearing interview of the intended witness or 
to view the photographs of the cooler. 
Third, the Commission's delay to issue a decision in this case, while 
unfortunate to all parties, has no bearing on Ms. Germer's right to compensation 
or the outcome of this case. 
19 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE LABOR COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT MS. 
GERMER'S INDUSTRIAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT 
COMPENSABLE 
Under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 
(2004), an employee is entitled to worker's compensation benefits for injuries 
occurring, "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment." id. To receive benefits, a claimant must, among other things, 
prove by a preponderance of evidence a causal connection between the injury 
and the activities or exertions in the work place. See Allen v. Industrial 
Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23 (Utah 1986). To do so, the claimant must 
prove both legal and medical causation. See id. at 25. In Allen, the threshold 
case on this issue, the Court stated: 
Where a claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which 
contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is 
required to prove legal causation. Where there is no preexisting 
condition, usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient. 
Allen. 729 P.2d at 26. 
Ms. Germer argues that the ALJ and Commission's findings of fact must be 
reversed since they do not consider the, "totality of the circumstances" and 
"disregard uncontroverted evidence." Specifically, she argues that the 
Commission disregarded crucial evidence that: (1) the floor was wet with 
condensation at the time of accident; (2) medical records of Dr. Germer note the 
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"forcefulness" of her fall; and, (3) Ms. Germer was carrying a large cookie sheet 
with fifty pounds of meat at the time of the accident. She argues that had the 
ALJ and Commission considered this evidence, her mode of injury would satisfy 
the higher standard of legal causation. Ms. Germer's arguments lacks merit for 
several reasons. 
A. Ms. Germer has failed to Marshall the Evidence. 
Ms. Germer's argument - that the court disregarded crucial evidence in 
rendering its finding regarding the mode of injury - must fail at the outset as she 
has failed to marshal the evidence as required by law. Utah's appellate courts 
have held that to successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party 
"must marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite 
the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Martinez v. Media-
Pavmaster Plus. 2007 UT 42 (Utah 2007); Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of 
Indus. Comm'n. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence 
that supports the challenged finding."). This requires counsel to construct the 
evidence supporting the adversary's position, and then "ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah 
1991). Compliance with this undertaking helps ensure that the factual findings of 
the agency are overturned only when lacking in substantial evidence. 
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Ms. Germer does not marshal the evidence. Ms. Germer is required to list 
all of the evidence which supports the findings of the Commission and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the findings. See 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). Since Ms. Germer has 
failed to marshal the evidence, the Court of Appeals is bound to assume that the 
record supports the Commission's findings. See Wade v. Stagl. 869 P.2d 9, 12 
(UtahCt.App. 1994). 
B. There is Substantial Evidence To Support the Commission's 
Findings Regarding What Exertions Were Involved in the Work 
Accident. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Ms. Germer satisfies her burden to marshal 
the evidence, there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's factual 
findings regarding the mechanism of injury. 
In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, the ALJ states in 
relevant part: 
Petitioner's claim arises from an incident that occurred on October 
30, 2004. Petitioner was in the cooler to pick up some meat that 
needed to be cooked for the day. When she attempted to leave the 
cooler, the Petitioner alleges that the door was stuck closed, and that 
when she kicked the door with her foot, she felt immediate pain in 
her knee and she "went down" on both knees. 
Petitioner testified that she was in the cooler.. .to obtain some meat that 
needed to be cooked for the day. She testified that she picked up three 
trays (each being approximately 18" x 24" much like a large cookie sheet) 
which weighed approximately 50 pounds total. She was careful to 
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approach the door and was holding the meat at about waist height. She 
stopped in front of the door to make sure her feet were "grounded." 
[because she knew the floor was wet]. This she explained was that she 
balanced on both feet. She was standing about one to two feet from the 
door at that time. She lifted her right foot and kicked the door "as hard as 
she could", expecting it would open. It did not. She felt immediate pain in 
her right knee... During the course of cross examination, Petitioner 
demonstrated the incidents of the morning of October 30, 2004. She held 
the tray (empty) in the approximate waist high position, and approached 
the door in the Courtroom for demonstration purposes. She stood near the 
door and described her activities. Of particular note is that Petitioner 
claimed during her testimony and during the demonstration that she kicked 
the door with her foot. However, at the distance she indicated she was 
standing from the door, at best she could have kicked the door with the ball 
of her foot (toes). Then she stated that the initial contact was with the toe 
area of her foot, then involved the full flat part of her foot. The does not 
appear possible at the distance she testified she was standing to wit: one 
to two feet from the door. 
Petitioner's testimony was further contradicted when she 
stated that she was standing balanced and "grounded" on both feet 
and her full body weight was moving toward the door. In the position 
she demonstrated her body was at rest, she not in continuous motion 
towards the door . . . 
(R., 170 at 46-47). 
In its Order Affirming ALJ's Decision, the Commission found as follows with 
regard to the mechanism of injury: 
The Commission adopts Judge Sessions Findings of Facts. 
The facts relevant to the motion for review are as follows: On 
October 30, 2003, Ms. Germer was retrieving trays of meat out of a 
walk-in cooler at Famous Dave's. As she held the meat trays in front 
of her, Ms. Germer kicked on the cooler door with her right foot in 
order to open the door. She felt immediate pain in her right knee. 
Although Ms. Germer claims that the door stuck when she kicked it, 
the evidence demonstrates that it did not stick. Prior to this accident, 
Ms. Germer had a pre-existing right knee condition and had 
undergone several surgeries to repair the right knee. (R., 170 at 164) 
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First, Ms. Germer argues that the court disregarded crucial evidence - that 
the floor was wet with condensation - which had a significant bearing on the 
case. However, Ms. Germer did not argue at the evidentiary hearing, or in her 
Motion for Review that condensation on the floor had any bearing on the court's 
evaluation of legal causation. On this basis, she has waived this argument on 
appeal. See Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 
1997) (failure to raise issues in Motion for Review are deemed waived on appeal 
as they are not properly preserved); Whitear v. Labor Comm'n. 973 P.2d 982 
(Utah 1998). In any event, the ALJ's Order appears to have considered the 
surface of the floor when the ALJ recognized that Ms. Germer's feet were 
"grounded" immediately prior to kicking the door. Apparently, Ms. Germer 
grounded her feet since she knew the floor was wet with condensation. (Tr., 29, 
66). 
Second, Ms. Germer argues that the court disregarded medical records of 
her orthopedic surgeon whom she states noted the "forcefulness" of her fall. 
Again, Ms. Germer did not raise this issue in her Motion for Review and, 
therefore, has waived such a challenge on appeal. Notwithstanding, the ALJ 
properly evaluated the mode of injury- as kicking the door - rather than events or 
forces subsequent to the accident. Indeed, in evaluating legal causation, the 
focus is on the actual impact or the physical exertion on the right knee from the 
work accident, rather than the consideration of events leading up to or after the 
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accident. This means the focus must be on the forces acting upon Ms. Germer's 
right knee at the time of the workplace event. 
Third, Ms. Germer argues that the court disregarded the fact that she was 
carrying a large cookie sheet with fifty pounds of meat at the time of the accident 
which is relevant to the legal causation evaluation. Ms. Germer again did not 
argue this in her Motion for Review and has waived this issue on appeal. 
Notwithstanding, the ALJ and Commission orders clearly recognize that Ms. 
Germer was carrying three trays of meat, totaling a combined weight of 50 
pounds at the time of the accident. (R., 46-48,164-65). Even with these trays in 
hand, however, the court found Ms. Germer's body balanced when she kicked 
the door open. She did no trip. She did not stumble. She did not fall. The fact that 
Ms. Germer has hold a tray of meat at the time she kicked the cooler door with 
her right foot had no bearing on the physical impact upon Ms. Germer's right 
knee caused by Ms. Germer kicking the cooler door. Accordingly, there was no 
error committed by the court. 
C. The Labor Commission Acted Reasonably and Rationally in 
Ruling That Ms. Germer's Injury Did Not Meet the Higher Legal 
Causation Standard 
This Court must next evaluate whether the Commission acted reasonably 
and rationally in ruling that the activities of October 30, 2004 did not rise to the 
level of an unusual or extraordinary exertion. 
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There is no dispute that the higher standard of legal causation as 
articulated in Allen applies in this case.2 Ms. Germer does not dispute the 
application of this standard, but rather argues that the mechanism of injury was 
an "unusual or extraordinary exertion", sufficient to meet this test. 
Ms. Germer's accident does not meet the higher standard of legal 
causation. In Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the 
threshold case on this issue, the Court stated: 
Where a claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which 
contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is 
required to prove legal causation. Where there is no preexisting 
condition, usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient. 
2
 Ms. Germer acknowledges that she suffered from chronic left and right knee 
problems which pre-dated the accident. While still in high school, Ms. Germer 
underwent both left and right knee surgeries to remove loose cartilage (R., 170 at 
002). In 1991 and 1992, Ms. Germer sought medical care for complaints of bilateral 
knee pain (R., 170 at 002). In 1993, Ms. Germer underwent bilateral knee surgery 
for persistent complaints of left and right knee pain. In January 2001, while 
employed as a CNA, Ms. Germer caught her right toe in a door jam and tripped and 
landed on her right knee. She was diagnosed with a right TCL, MCL, LCL, and 
lateral meniscus tears (R., 170 at 172). Ms. Germer was then referred to physical 
therapy for almost six months. 
On April 27,2001, Ms. Germer underwent a right knee PCL reconstruction (R., 
170 at 60-70). On October 22, 2001, Ms. Germer's right knee hardware was 
removed (R., 170 at 163). On December 27,2003, Ms. Germer jumped from a snow 
bank and landed on her right knee. The right knee gave way (R., 170 at 107). 
From Ms. Germer's chronic and long-standing right knee problems, it is not 
disputed that Ms. Germer brought an added risk of injury to her right knee to her 
employment with Respondent Famous Dave's. The ALJ and the Commission were 
correct to find that Ms. Germer's accident is subject to a higher standard of legal 
causation. 
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Legal Cause - Whether an injury arose out of or in the course of 
employment is difficult to determine where the employee brings to the 
workplace a personal element of risk such as a preexisting condition. 
Just because a person suffers a preexisting condition, he or she is 
not disqualified from obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear 
that "the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an 
industrial accident is compensable . . . . " To meet the legal causation 
requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition must show that 
the employment contributed something substantial to increase the 
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This 
additional element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an 
exertion greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This 
extra exertion serves to offset the preexisting condition of the 
employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for 
impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at 
work. Larson summarized how the legal cause rule would work in 
practice as follows: If there is some personal causal contribution in 
the form of a [preexisting condition], the employment contribution 
must take the form of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment 
l i f e . . . . 
If there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there is no prior 
weakness or disease, any exertion connected with the employment 
and causally connected with the [injury] as a matter of medical fact is 
adequate to satisfy the legal test of causation. Thus, where the 
claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes to the 
injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal 
causation. Where there is no preexisting condition, a usual or 
ordinary exertion is sufficient. 
We believe an objective standard of comparison will provide a more 
consistent and predictable standard for the Commission and this 
Court to follow. In evaluating typical nonemployment activity, the 
focus is on what typical nonemployment activities are generally 
expected of people in today's society, not what this particular claimant 
is accustomed to doing. Typical activities and exertions expected of 
men and women in the latter part of the 20th century, for example, 
include taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying 
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a 
small child to chest height, and climbing the stairs in buildings. By 
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using an objective standard, the case law will eventually define a 
standard for typical "nonemployment activity" in much the way case 
law has developed the standard of care for the reasonable man in tort 
law. 
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15, 26-27 (Utah 1986). 
The Commission found that the mechanism of injury occurred while Ms. 
Germer was carrying approximately fifty pounds of ribs on three metal trays from 
a walk-in cooler. Ms. Germer approached the walk-in cooler door and stopped 
one to two feet from the cooler door. Both of Ms. Germer's feet were grounded 
on the walk-in cooler floor (Tr., 66-67) due to condensation on the floor. Ms. 
Germer was balanced while holding the trays of ribs in her hands at an angle, the 
front edge of each tray resting against her abdomen. Ms. Germer was standing 
still (Tr., 67). She did not make a forward continuous movement toward the walk-
in cooler door (Tr., 67). Ms. Germer then kicked the door with her right foot (Tr., 
87). The bottom of Ms. Germer's right foot contacted the walk-in cooler door first 
(Tr, 87-88). Ms. Germer did not injure her right knee by slipping and falling to the 
cooler room floor. She did not trip. She did not stumble. She did not awkwardly 
twist her knee nor lose her balance. Ms. Germer's right knee did not come in 
direct contact with the freezer door, nor did her right knee directly hit the cooler 
floor as she slumped to the floor after kicking the cooler door. 
Given the mechanism of injury, the ALJ and Commission acted reasonably 
and rationally in finding that the physical exertion placed on Ms. Germer's right 
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knee at the time she claimed to have kicked the walk-in cooler door with her right 
foot was not extraordinary or unusual. See Bigler v. TW Services. MD 95-0838-
CA (8/8/96) (a one time lunge and twist to catch a falling object is not uncommon 
of activities in everyday life and does not involve unusual exertion). 
The trays of ribs that Ms. Germer held her in arms at the time of the alleged 
accident had no bearing on the physical exertion, if any, placed on Ms. Germer's 
right knee at the time she attempted to kick the walk-in cooler door with her right 
foot. Certainly, Ms. Germer did not injure her right knee from having carried the 
trays of ribs. There was nothing awkward, extraordinary or difficult about her 
effort to hold the trays of ribs as Ms. Germer attempted to kick the walk-in cooler 
door with her right foot. Despite carrying the trays of ribs, Ms. Germer was 
balanced, well-grounded, and stable at the time she claims to have kicked the 
door with her right foot. Holding the tray of ribs against her abdomen did not 
cause Ms. Germer to trip, slip, stumble, lose her balance, or footing, or cause her 
to fall to the cooler floor. 
Famous Dave's agrees with the ALJ and the Commission that it is a 
common experience of non-employment life for persons to use their feet to kick a 
door, slide a box or garbage can, or even move furniture or other items with a leg 
or foot. Often such an action may occur while the person is lifting or carrying 
certain objects. The ALJ and the Commission was also correct to discern that 
individuals in their non-employment life use their feet to kick a ball while engaging 
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in a sport or other type of extra-curricular activity. This alleged accident is also 
similar to non-employment activities such as climbing or descending stairs, or 
stepping on uneven surfaces. In this case, the physical exertion placed upon Ms. 
Germer's right knee at the time of the accident was de minimis. Ms. Germer's 
accident does not meet the higher standard of legal causation. The Court of 
Appeals should affirm the ALJ's decision to deny workers' compensation benefits 
to Ms. Germer because her claim did not meet the higher standard of legal 
causation. 
POINT 2: THE COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE MS. GERMER'S RIGHT 
TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT ADMITTED CERTAIN EVIDENCE. 
Ms. Germer was not surprised by the testimony of Scott Morton or the 
photographs of the walk-in cooler which were introduced as evidence 
at the evidentiary hearing. 
Ms. Germer next argues that she was denied due process when the court 
allowed the testimony of Scott Morton and photographs of the walk-in cooler at 
the evidentiary hearing. Famous Dave's disagrees and submits that there was 
no due process violation. 
Section 34A-2-802 of the Utah Code states that the Commission is not 
bound by usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by technical or 
formal rules of procedure. Notwithstanding, Utah Courts have held that these 
rules must not deprive parties of their constitutional right to an impartial hearing. 
See Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. 245 P. 343 (Utah 
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1926); Workers Comp. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n. 761 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution allows for due process of law. 
Additionally, the Utah Administrative Procedure's Act guarantees parties a 
reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-206. 
Utah's courts have interpreted these sections to entitle a party to notice of 
proceedings and the opportunity to present testimony and witnesses at 
administrative proceedings. See Workers Compensation Fund v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 761 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In WCF. the court held: 
[i]t is fundamental that in investigations such as the Industrial 
Commission is authorized to make, any party to a cause or 
proceeding is entitled to be advised of and afforded an opportunity to 
meet such evidence as the commission may consider and rely on in 
the making of its findings and decision. 
Id- at 575-76. 
Three weeks prior to the evidentiary hearing, Famous Dave's provided 
Supplemental Answers to Ms. Germer's previous discovery requests. (R., 63). 
In the Supplemental Answers, Famous Dave's informed Ms. Germer of their 
intent to call Scott Morton as a witness at the evidentiary hearing. Famous 
Dave's provided Ms. Germer with a summary of the testimony to be solicited from 
Mr. Morton at the evidentiary hearing. Famous Dave's also submitted this 
information to the Commission in the pre-trial disclosures on March 8, 2006. (R., 
28). Famous Dave's was not obligated, as Ms. Germer suggests, to inform Ms. 
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Germer of each and every bit and piece of testimony to be solicited from a 
witness at the evidentiary hearing. Given the nature of the claim and legal 
causation defense raised in Famous Dave's' Answer, Ms. Germer knew, or 
should have known, that Famous Dave's would call Mr. Morton, or other 
manager, to testify regarding the operation of the walk-in cooler door, and that the 
subject of the functionality of the walk-in cooler would be addressed by Mr. 
Morton. Ms. Germer could have deposed Mr. Morton prior to the evidentiary 
hearing, or made some effort to interview this witness, if Ms. Germer was 
concerned with what testimony Mr. Morton was to offer at the evidentiary hearing. 
Ms. Germer made no request to depose or to interview Mr. Morton once Ms. 
Germer had been notified that Famous Dave's would call Mr. Morton to testify. 
Even after counsel for Famous Dave's spoke to counsel for Ms. Germer 
several days prior to the evidentiary hearing by telephone, during which 
telephone conversation, counsel for Famous Dave's informed counsel for Ms. 
Germer that Mr. Morton would be called to testify, counsel for Ms. Germer made 
no oral or written request to depose or to interview Mr. Morton, or make any effort 
to discover the details of Mr. Morton's testimony. 
In addition, there is no merit to Ms. Germer's argument that she was 
prejudiced by Mr. Morton's testimony that the cooler floor was, "coming up." The 
condition of the cooler floor had nothing to do with Ms. Germer's reported 
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accident. Consequently, Ms. Germer made no effort herself to focus on this issue 
at the hearing, or to call any witness to support this argument. 
Moreover, during counsel's pre-hearing telephone conference, counsel for 
Ms. Germer made no oral or written request to review the photographs which 
were to be provided, for illustrative purposes, to the ALJ for review at the 
evidentiary hearing. Ms. Germer was not surprised or tricked by Mr. Morton's 
testimony or the introduction of the walk-in cooler photographs. In reality, 
however, neither Mr. Morton's testimony nor Famous Dave's submission of the 
walk-in cooler photographs had any bearing on the ALJ or Commission's finding 
that Ms. Germer's alleged accident did not meet the higher standard of legal 
causation. The photographs were merely introduced into evidence by counsel for 
Famous Dave's so that the ALJ would have a better understanding of the lay-out 
of the walk-in cooler and cooler door as Ms. Germer provided her testimony to 
ALJ. The photographs served a dual purpose to aide both the ALJ and Ms. 
Germer as she explained her injury event to the ALJ. The substance of Mr. 
Morton's testimony and the existence of the walk-in cooler photographs 
were fairly disclosed to Ms. Germer's legal counsel prior to the evidentiary 
hearing. Counsel for Ms. Germer simply failed to act on this information prior to 
the evidentiary hearing. 
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POINT 3: THE COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN COURT'S 
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHEN IT ISSUED 
THE ORDER DENYING BENEFITS. 
Ms. Germer next argues that the Commission violated the Open Court's 
Provision of the Utah Constitution when it took nearly two years to issue the 
Order denying benefits. Ms. Germer cites to Utah Const. Art I. § 11 which 
provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation shall have remedy by due 
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay. 
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 11. This constitutional provision has been interpreted to 
guarantee that litigants will have their "day in court." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. 
Co.. 2002 UT 6, H38, 44 P.3d 663; Duke v. Graham. 2007 UT 31, 1J23 (Utah 
2007). 
A Motion for Review of the ALJ's Order was filed by Ms. Germer on May 5, 
2006. The Commission entered its Order Affirming ALJ's Decision on April 23, 
2008. Famous Dave's recognizes Ms. Germer's concern that the administrative 
appeals process comes with delay. It is also in the interest of Famous Dave's 
to have orders from the Commission issued in a more expedited fashion, if 
possible. Certainly, such delay affects not only the claimant, but also the 
employer and insurance carrier. However, the Commission's delay in this case 
has no bearing on whether Ms. Germer is entitled to workers' compensation 
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benefits, or whether she was provided a fair hearing and the opportunity to be 
heard. 
The Commission's delay to issue an order on Ms. Germer's Motion for 
Review did not violate the open court's provision of the state constitution. Ms. 
Germer had her "day in court." She was given the opportunity to present her case 
before an impartial administrative law judge. Unfortunately, the delay in the 
appeals process stems from the significant number of cases heard at the 
Commission and Appeals Board levels. Cases at the Commission are 
adjudicated by seven Administrative Law Judges. Fortunately, given the number 
of judges, hearings are promptly scheduled within four to five months from the 
date of filing of the Application for Hearing. Labor Commission orders are now 
issued within only a three to four months after the hearing. However, between 
2006 and 2008, staffing at the Commission appeals level provided for only a 
staffed attorney (General Counsel), to review motions for review, and submit 
recommendations to the Appeals Board or Commissioner for final resolution. 
Unfortunately, during that time period, funding provided by the Legislature did not 
allow the Commission to hire additional legal staff at the Commission appeals 
level to keep up with the high numbers of appeals filed by aggrieved parties. 
Since then, the Legislature has increased funding to the Commission which has 
permitted additional attorney staffing to review appeals and provide a more 
expedited review a cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Respondents ask the Court of 
Appeals to affirm the Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. Petitioner's 
workers' compensation claims should be dismissed with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted this .TTday of March, 2009. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Attorneys for Appellees Famous Dave's and/or 
Wausau Insurance. Co. 
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II. ISSUES-
;. : Md the industrial event of October 30,2004 cause Lindsay Germer's right knee p 
problems u issue in this case? (Legal Causej A 
0 
2. )id the industrial event of Octobe! 30,2004 cause Lindsay Germer to suffer any jj 
periods of temporary total disability? A 
3 J>id the industrial event of October 30,2004 cause Lindsay Germer to suffer any & 
p< rmanent partial disability? (Medical Cause s
 f( 
6 
HI. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. fcj 
8 
ITiis hearing was the origuial evi<J ,mtiary hearing in the matter. No prior hearings £j. 
were conducted. 
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. Employment 
The parties agreed that Respondent famous Dave's employed Lindsay Germer, from June 
3,2004 to December 13,2004, 
B. Compensation Rate. 
At the time of the accident in issue, Lindsay Genner, H I married with H P dependent 
children. The parties stipulated that Lindsay Germer's compensation with Famous Dave's and 
Wausau Insurance Company at the time of the accident in issue equaled $430.00 per week as the 
computation rate for temporary total disability compensation. 
C The Industrial Accident 
Petitioner's claim arises from an incident feat occurred on October 30, 2004. Petitioner 
was in the cooler to pick up some meat that needed to be cooked for the day. When she 
attempted to leave the cooler, the Petitioner alleges that the door was stuck closed, and that when 
sbe kicked the door with her foot, she felt immediate pmn in hot knee and she Vent down* on 
both knees. It is not disputed that Petitioner was acting in the course and scope of her 
employment on the dale of the incident Legal cause under the higher Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) standard is disputed because of undisputed extensive pre-
existing conditions to Petitioner's right knee. 
D, Other Relevant Findings. 
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1. vVhile Petitioner initially testified that die door on the new walk-in cooler always 
stuck in th i closed position, she later changrxl her testimony to reveal that on the morning of the 
incident s' te had entered the cooler and it had in fact not stuck. She also testified that she 
reported the malfunctioning door to Mr. M< >rton. However, the testimony of Scott Morton (the 0 
; -ea manager who was at the location for significant periods of time from construction to the 0 
present d e) was that in fact the door die? not stick and despite the claim to the contrary by 0 
Petitioner, no employee including Petitione had ever complained of a sticking door on the new Jj. 
cooler. Petitioner changed her testimony on this issue or, cross examination to state that she did B 
r >t report the malfunction to Mr. Morton. The weight of the evidence in the regard \ 
\ -eponderates in favor of the testimony by \ ur. Morton. ti 
«< 
2. Petitioner testified that she was in the cooler at approximately 9:00 AM to obtain £ 
some meat that needed to be cooked for tho day. She testified that she picked up 3 trays (each J 
being approximately 18** x 24" much like a large cookie sheet) which weighed approximately | j , 
50Ibs total. She was careful to approach the door and was holding the meat at about waist 
height, She stopped in front of the door to make sure her feet were 'grounded.' This she 
explained was that she was balanced on boih feet. She was standing about one to two feet from 
the door at that time, She lifted her rigM foot and lacked the door 'as hard as she could', 
expecting it would open. It did not, She felt immediate pain in tier right knee. In her words 'she 
went dowu on both knees/ The pain was severe. There is no indication that she dropped the 
meat. Th* demonstration showed that she managed to keep the meat in front of her throughout 
the incident. 
3. After she caught her breath, she placed the meat on the chicken boxes located next to 
tl e door and used her body weight to open the door. She worked the remainder of the shift that 
d ty and the two days that followed. 
4. Two days later, November 1, 2004, she sought medical care for the pain. Petitioner 
was off work from November 1 to November 4, then worked approximately 5 weeks (often up to 
80-90 hours per week) to December 13, 2004 at which time she resigned her position. On 
January 2, 2005 she was working for The Outback as a waitress working from 9-13 hours per 
day. 
5. During the course of cross examination, Petitioner demonstrated the incidents of the 
morning of October 30 2004, She held the tray (empty) in the approximate waist high position, 
and approached the door in the Courtroom for demonstration purposes. She stood near the door 
and desctibed her activities. Of particular note is that Petitioner claimed during her testimony 
and during the demonstration that she kicked the door with her foot. However, at the distance 
she indicated she was standing from the door, at best she could have kicked the door with the 
ball of her foot (toes). Then she stated that the initial contact was with the toe area of her foot, 
then involved the full flat part of her foot. This does not appear possible at the distance she 
testified she was standing to wit: one to two feet from the door. 
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6. Petitioner's testimony was further contradicted when she stated that she was standing 
balanced a id * grounded* on both feet and h*r full body weight was moving toward the door. In 
the positio i she demonstrated, her body was at rest, not in continuous motion toward the door, 
nor could u be at that close proximity to the Joor. She was at rest and balanced. !-( f\ 
o 
i 
7. t is undisputed that Petitioner has had prior surgeries to her right knee including a 
reconstruction of her PCL {posterior crucial 5 ligament). Injury to her right knee is documented ?j 
back to agt* 14. Petitioner was born in 1976. y 
V, CONCI USIONS OF LAW ^ 
0 
Petitioner bears the burden of proof s a both legal and medical causation. Turning first to LJ, 
k gal cause: To qualify for benefits under this standard, an injured worker must, among other gj; 
things, establish that his or her exertions at r/ork were the Hegal cause* of the injury in question* | i 
Alien v. Industrial Commission, at 25. In A foe River Coal Co, v. Industrial Commission* 731 
P,2d 1079,1082 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court described the test for legal causation as 
follows: 
Under Allen^ a usual or ordinary i icertion with the employers duties will 
Suffice to show legal cause. However, if the claimant suffers from a pre-
listing condition, then he or she must show that the employment activity 
involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the 4tusual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." . . . The requirement 
of Unusual or extraordinary exertion'' is designed to screen out those 
injuries that result from a personal condition which the worker brings to the 
job, rather than from exertions required of the employee in the workplace. 
(Citations omitted,) 
In American Roofing v. Industrial Commission, 752 P,2d 912 (Utah App., 1988), the 
Utah Court of Appeals finding that while twisting, bending or lifting in themselves are not 
unusual, the combination of bending, twisting and jerking a substantial weight is unusual. The 
combination of actions satisfied the more stringent prong of Alien. 
In Allen the Supreme Court gave specific examples of typical non-employment life 
exertions such as iftaking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, 
changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height and climbing stairs in 
buildings." Here Ms. Gtrmer's incident included lifting approximately 50lbs and carrying it to 
another part of the restaurant for cooking. It cannot be said that this lifting alone is extraordinary 
or unusual. The focus then becomes die mechanics of the incident (including the exertion of 
force demonstrated at the time of injury) when injury occurred. 
Petitioner was in the act of carrying an arm load of meat. She states that she stopped at 
the door made sure she was balanced on both feet and then lifted her right leg and kicked the 
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'Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission, The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
n 
H 
door with th : toes of her foot. It is common experience for people to use their feet to kick or 
otherwise as Jst in sliding boxes and garbage c $ns while moving them. It is common experience 
for people tc use the toes (or ball) of their feet to open or close a door. It may even be common 
for people tc use the toes or ball of their feet tv kick a ball when active in sports such as soccer or %.\
foe <-ball in ordinary life. yA 
The evidence preponderates in support >f the interpretation that using the facts as f\ 
described and demonstrated by Petitioner: that from a distance of one to two feet from the door, 
staring from a resting position when both feet <*re flat on the floor aind the body is balanced and 
the light foot is raised to kick the door open* tl J force used or exerted in attempting to open the *j 
doc is no mire significant thu the force used n noaemployment life to accomplish the same or ^ 
sim, lar purposes. The proof of legal cause has Med. rj 
Of the issues raised by Petitioner in th« Application for Hearing, legal cause is the Q 
threshold issue. Having foiled to meet thai thr^  shold burden of proof the remaining issues are 
moot It is well established in Utah law that o rnrts, and by extension, administrative agencies, 
should not adjudicate claims when such adjudication will have no practical effect. "Once a 
controversy has become moot, a trial court should enter an order of dismissal** Merhish v. H.A. 
Fohon & Associates, 646 P.2d 731,732 (Utah 1982)> See also: Kerning Lu v. St. Marks 
Hospital* 8010440 (LC Appeals Board, January 2005). Therefore, no further discussion of the 
remaining issnes will be set forth here. 
VI. ORDER 
IT ta THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner's Application for Hearing is dismissed with 
prejudice and on the merits, 
DATED Aprii^2006. 
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/ ny party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregou g review Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response I none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducic i by the Utah Labor Commission 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
LINDSAY GI HMER, 
Petition er, 1 
vs. 1 
FAMOUS DAVE'S a»d 
WAUSAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Respondents. 
j ORDER AFFIRMING 
ALI'S DECISION 
Case No. 05-0318 
k'Wmmmmmmmmmmmmmm t\miMi\mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm~mmmmmmmmmmam 
Lindsay Germer asks the Utah Labor Co nmission to review Administrative Law Judge 
Sessions' denial of Ms, Germer's claim for bene^is under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, 
Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 63*46b-12 and g 34A-2-8O10? 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Ms. Germer claims workers' compensation benefits from Famous Dave's and its insurance 
carrier, Wausau Insurance Company (referred to jointly as "Famous Dave's"), for a work accident 
that occ irred on October 30, 2003, allegedly causing injury to her right knee. After holding an 
evident) try hearing, Judge Sessions denied benefits. 
I n her motion for review, Ms. Germer argues that hkd Famous Dave's given her proper notice 
of the substance of the testimony of one of its witnesses, she would have been able to refute the 
evidence that she claims led Judge Sessions to conclude there was no legal causation. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts Judge Session's findings of facts. The facts relevant to the motion 
for review are as follows: On October 30, 2003, Ms, Germer was retrieving trays of meat out of a 
walk-ir. cooler at Famous Dave's. As she held the meat trays in front of her, Ms, Germer kicked on 
the cooler door with her right foot in order to open die door. She felt immediate pain in her right 
knee. Although Ms. Germer claims that the door stuck when she kicked it, the evidence 
demonstrates that it did not stick. Prior to this accident, Ms. Germer had a preexisting right knee 
condition and had undergone several surgeries to repair the right knee. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to workers 
injur* d by accident "arising out of and in the cour e of* employment. To qualify for benefits under 
the ft /egoing standard, an injured worker must es-1 abiish that his or her work was the 'legal cause" of 
the injur>\ AlLnv Industrial Commission, 7291 2d 15,25 (Utah 1986). The requirement of legal 
causation is explained tn Price River Coal Co. v. i» >du$!rial Coi mission, 731 P.2d 1079,1082 (Utah 
1986)-
Under Alien, a usual or o? iinary exertion^ so long as it is an activity connected with 
the employee's duties, will suffice to she w legal cause. However, if the claimant 
suffers from a pre-existing condition, then he or she must show that the employment 
activity Involved some unusual or extr ^ordinary exertion over and above the 
**usuaJ wear and tear and exertions of nor-employment life"... The requirement of 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" is des:gned to screen oui those injuries that result 
from a personal condition which the worker brings to the job, rather than from 
exertions required of the employee in the vorkplace, (Citations omitted; emphasis 
added.) 
Because Ms. Germer suffered from a preexisting condition that contributed to her current 
knee problems, tier claim is subject to the more stringent test for legal causation, which requires that 
she show her work related exertion was "unusual or extraordinary." The Commission understands 
Ms. Germer to argue that her exertion in kicking the door was unusual or extraordinary because the 
door w is stuck and did not swing freely. The Commission has found that the door did not stick. 
Neverti cless, even assuming the door did stick, the Commission is not convinced that this exertion 
would qualify as "unusual or extraordinary exertion" as compared to the usual wear and tear 
exertions of nonemployment life. Therefore, the Commicsion concludes that Ms. Germer has not 
satisfied the test for legal causation and eannot prevail on her claim for benefits. 
ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge Session's decision, It is so ordered. 
Dated this JJ day * .f April, 2008, 
Sherrie Hayashi 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Or ier. Any such request for 
recom deration nust be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, aj.y party may appeal thisorder to tl e Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be rect ived by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 certify that a copy of the foregoing On er Affirming ALJ's Decision inthe matter of 
Lindsay Germer, Case No. 05-0318, was mailed Urst class postage prepaid this^^day of April, 
2008, to the following: 
Lindsuy Germer 
1735 W 540 N #1202 
St George UT 8-770 
Famous Dave's 
391SF\verRd 
StGeor.'.cUT 84770 
Wausau Insurance Company 
C. T. Corp. System Designated Agent 
136 ES Temple Ste 2100 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Aaron Prisbrey, Esq. 
1090 E Tabernacle St 
St George UT 84770 
Bret Gardner, Esq. 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
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